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EFFector Online Volume 07 No. 10      June 14, 1994       editors@eff.org

A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation        ISSN 1062-9424

ALERT: Crypto Export Provisions - One Day Left to Make or Break

FOIA Documents Reveal Even OLA and OLC Know ITAR Is Unconstitutional

Blaze Paper Details Hole In Clipper/Capstone/EES Scheme

Karn Files Crypto Export CJ Appeal for _Applied_Cryptography_ Disk

EFF's Godwin at Cyberspace Censorship Event on CompuServe

A New Face at EFF - Doug Craven, Office Manager/Bookkeeper

USENIX Address of EFF's Barlow Available on Cassette from O'Reilly

Note About our FTP Site

What YOU Can Do

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject: ALERT: Crypto Export Provisions - One Day Left to Make or Break

------------------------------------------------------------------------

*DISTRIBUTE WIDELY AND QUICKLY*

ONE DAY DEADLINE!  The House Intelligence Committee will probably make their

June 15, 1994.  If you've not had your say on whether the State Dept. & NSA

entire Intelligence Cmte. is below, as is a sample letter, and background

nformation on this important legislative action.  If you don't get

through on your first fax attempt, keep trying.  All of these numbers

******* What You Can Do

Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS).  Ask him in your own

You may wish to send a copy of this to the committee itself also.

Fax number: +1 202 225 5398      Committee fax: +1 202 225 1991

Glickman at glickman@eff.org.  We'll deliver it for you, provide it

arrives before noon, at which point all such messages must be delivered.

Rep. Glickman TODAY, especially if they are among Glickman's Kansas

constituents.

******* Phone and Fax Numbers 

House Intelligence Committee 

----------------------------

Subcommittee phone:  +1 202 225 4121

Subcommittee fax:    +1 202 225 1991    <== send your fax HERE <==

___________________________________________________________________________

D KS Glickman, Daniel         +1 202 225 6216   +1 202 225 5398    Chair

D WA Dicks, Norman D.         +1 202 225 5916   +1 202 226 1176

D CA Dixon, Julian C.         +1 202 225 7084   +1 202 225 4091

D NJ Torricelli, Robert       +1 202 224 5061   +1 202 225 0843

D TX Coleman, Ronald D.       +1 202 225 4831   +1 202 225 4831

 [Coleman's staff manually switch line to fax if they hear fax tones.

 Preceeding your fax with a voice call might help]

D CO Skaggs, David E.         +1 202 225 2161   +1 202 225 9127

D NV Bilbray, James H.        +1 202 225 5965   +1 202 225 8808

D CA Pelosi, Nancy            +1 202 225 4965   +1 202 225 8259

D TX Laughlin, Gregory H.     +1 202 225 2831   +1 202 225 1108

D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud)  +1 202 225 4801   private

D RI Reed, John F.            +1 202 225 2735   +1 202 225 9580

D MO Gephardt, Richard A.     +1 202 225 2671   +1 202 225 7452

R TX Combest, Larry           +1 202 225 4005   +1 202 225 9615

R NE Bereuter, Douglas        +1 202 225 4806   +1 202 226 1148

R CA Dornan, Robert K.        +1 202 225 2965   private

 [Dornan's public fax disconnected; office refuses to divulge a fax number]

R FL Young, C. W. (Bill)      +1 202 225 5961   +1 202 225 9764

R PA Gekas, George W.         +1 202 225 4315   +1 202 225 8440

R UT Hansen, James V.         +1 202 225 0453   +1 202 225 5857

R CA Lewis, Jerry             +1 202 225 5861   +1 202 225 6498

R IL Michel, Robert H.        +1 202 225 6201   +1 202 225 9461

****** Sample Fax

FAX to:  202-225-1991 and 202-225-5398

Representative Daniel Glickman

Chair

House Intelligence Committee

U.S House of Representatives

Dear Representative Glickman:

that you allow them to remain as they were introduced in Rep. Cantwell's 

H.R. 3627, and subsequently incorporated into H.R. 3937. Privacy is the

basis for my concern, and I support the ability to use secure encryption. 

Additionally, prohibiting the export of secure cryptography from the United

States puts the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage internationally, for who

Chip", or products intentionally weakened to pass excessively stringent

export restrictions)?  Please, support privacy and security by preserving

the cryptography export language of H.R. 3937.

****** More Information

The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at:

  ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt

  gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt

  http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt

  BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp

For current status on the bill:

  ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update

  gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update

  http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update

  BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd

A general Web page on crypto export policy is at:

  http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html

****** Background (from John Gilmore , EFF Board of Directors)

Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most

encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to

limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC

authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department.

Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First Amendment"-

Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial software.  The bill

also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening the regulations even if

NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce.

A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in

the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937.

Now the battle has become more intense.  This portion of H.R. 3937 has

been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to

kill or severely maim it.  We need your help again, to urge the

The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for

the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic

"national security" wand.  They need plenty of input from the public

that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good

encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy.

Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health

care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change.

The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by

the operating systems and network protocols on which they run.  If

this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into

Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into

the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television.  The

local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these

two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this

not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to

be made secure and private.  With this bill, these limits disappear.

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume

exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious

Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment.

The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet.

Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S.

archive sites.  It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat

of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software.

This is the dream we've all been working toward.  The Intelligence

Committee must make its decision on the bill before June 16, so time is

critical. Thanks again for your help!  You can check at any time on the

current status of the campaign at the location mentioned above.  Send any

comments on this campaign to campaign@eff.org.

John Gilmore

Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee

EFF Board of Directors

Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research

------------------------------

------------------------------

Subject: FOIA Documents Reveal Even OLA and OLC Know ITAR Is Unconstitutional

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The documents detailed below were obtained by Freedom of Information Act

Legislative Affairs have determined that portions of the ITAR export

the First Amendment, and also indicated that several Congressional

committees, the President, and the Departement of State have been made

aware of the constitutional problem of the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations.  Despite these facts, the cryptography export provisions of

H.R. 3937 are still in danger of being removed or rendered worthless in

committee tomorrow.

For details on how to do your own FOIA submissions,

These documents were obtained by Lee Tien, an attorney for EFF

Boardmember John Gilmore.  Each document was scanned and edited for

obvious mistakes.

The full documents are available at:

ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/ITAR_FOIA/

BBS: +1 202 638 6119, 6120 (8-N-1, 14.4k), "Privacy--Clipper/ITAR" file area

A brief description of the content of each of the documents

[file names in brackets are the BBS filenames]

tar_hr_govop_hearing.transcript [ITARHEAR.TRN]

	This is the transcript of a series of hearings held before a 

	subcommittee of the House Comittee on Government 

	Operations.  It is especially interesting for the two items it 

	includes in the report; one memo shows that the Office of Legal 

	Counsel concluded that ITAR was unconstitutional, and some 

	testimony indicates that the State Department and the 

	President may have ignored possibly binding legal advice from 

	the OLC.

mcconnell_garn.letter [ITAR1.LTR]

	This is a letter from Robert McConnell, Assistant Attorney 

	General for Legal and Intergovernmental affairs to Jake Garn, 

	the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 

	and Urban Affairs.  This letter highlights the position that the 

	term "technology" as defined by the ITAR is overly broad and 

	presents a probable violation of the First Amendment.

mcconnell_zablocki.letter [ITAR2.LTR]

	Clement Zablocki was the Chairman of the House Committee on 

	Foreign Affairs.  This letter is a review of a bill that would 

	amend the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  It is particularly 

	good in that it makes a compelling argument for why the ITAR 

	establishes a system of prior restraint.

olson_mcconnell.letter [ITAR3.LTR]

	This is a follow-up letter to Robert McConnell from Theodore 

	Olson, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 

	Counsel.  It reaffirms the OLC position that the ITAR establishes 

	a regulatory scheme that "extends too broadly into an area of 

	protected First Amendment speech."

	The cover letter/reply to Lee Tien's FOIA request.  Notable for 

	the fact that there are other documents (specifically from the 

	FBI and NSA) that could be relevant.

	A brief note acknowledging that the ITAR is overly broad, from

        Simms of OLA to McConnell.

	This is a memo prepared for Davis Robinson, then the Legal 

	Adviser for the Department of State.  This is a very well-

	documented paper on the various unconstitutional provisions 

	of ITAR.  The two areas this memo concentrates on are the 

	"technical data"  definition as well as the definition of "export."    

	Near the conclusion, Simms states: "We remain of the opinion, 

	however, that ... the ITAR still present some areas of 

	potentially unconstitutional application.  ...The best legal 

	solution ... is for the Department of State, not the courts, to 

	narrow the regulations."

------------------------------

Subject: Blaze Paper Details Hole In Clipper/Capstone/EES Scheme

----------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Matthew Blaze, an AT&T Bell Labs researcher, recently discovered a 

fundamental flaw in the Administration/NSA Escrowed Encryption Standard

cryptographic chips, particularly those known originally as Capstone.  

The EES Capstone chips, used in PCMCIA cards for data encryption on laptop

computers, use the same cryptographic algorithm (Skipjack) and key "escrow"

misfeature does not directly apply to Clipper, since it is intended for use

n telephone equipment rather than computers.  More importantly, however,

s the fact that Blaze's discovery indicates a deep flaw in the entire EES

flaw is also present in the Clipper EES system, just not as easy to exploit.

Both Clipper and Capstone rely on a series of numbers referred to as the

LEAF (Law Enforcement Access Field).  The LEAF is used to verify chip

of a Clipper conversation, or a copy of Capstone-encoded data, to identify

the chip serial number, and obtain copies of the keys held by the "escrow"

agents.  Using these keys, they may decrypt the message or data at will - 

and the idea of the government holding the keys to personal privacy has

been the primary objection to the EES scheme.

The flaw Blaze has unearthed is another objection among many: anyone with

"sufficient" computer skills can alter the LEAF to verify validity of a

chip produced the encrypted information, and thus would be unable to get the

According to a June 2 article by John Markoff in the _New_York_Times_, NSA

officials do not deny the existence of the flaw, though both NSA and AT&T

maintain that Clipper is still useful.

The full text of Dr. Blaze's report, "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed

Encryption Standard", is available from:

ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/

BBS: +1 202 638 6119, 6120 (8-N-1, 14.4k), "Privacy--Clipper/ITAR" file area

[Filenames in brackets are BBS filenames.  ZIP-compressed copies are also

available on the BBS.]

ASCII version: ees_flaw_blaze.paper  [EESFLAW.PPR]

Also of interest:

ees_nist_senate.answers [EES_NIST.ANS] - answers from NIST to the Senate

Technology and Law Subcommittee's 30 pointed questions regarding the

EES/Clipper.  Some of the answers are literally astounding.

------------------------------

Subject: Karn Files Crypto Export CJ Appeal for _Applied_Cryptography_ Disk

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Phil Karn 

[Background: Beginning in Jan. 1994, Phil Karn attempted to have Commodity

Jurisdiction over Bruce Scheier's _Applied_Cryptography_ and a related

the State Dept., notorious for refusing the export of cryptographic

material, to the Commerce Dept., which regularly approved such export.

The State Dept. aknowledged that they did not have jurisdiction over the

book, but illogically maintain that the diskette is within their

letter regarding the crypto export provisions of H.R. 3937 follow. - ed.]

[...]

Note that the "Center for Defense Trade" mentioned in the ITARs as the

address for administrative appeals no longer exists. I got

Dr. Harris's name and address from Tom Denners of ODTC.

******

Dr. Martha C. Harris

Deputy Assistant Secretary For Export Controls

United States Department of State

Room 7325A

Washington DC 20522

Subject: Appeal in CJ Case 081-94, "Applied Cryptography Source Code Disk"

Also references: CJ Case 038-94, "Applied Cryptography", a book by

Bruce Schneier

                APPEAL OF COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION

This is an appeal under 22 CFR 120.4(g) of an adverse decision by the

Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) in the above cited case.  It

s also a request for ODTC to justify their decision and to respond to

the points made here.

classified the subject of this appeal, the "Applied Cryptography

Source Code Disk", ("the Diskette") as a defense article under

category XIII(b)(1) of the United States Munitions List. I hereby

formally appeal this determination on several grounds:

the book "Applied Cryptography" ("the Book"), which ODTC previously

a publicly available book, by ODTC's own prior interpretation of the

very same "public domain" exemption; and

Therefore, the dissemination of the publicly available Diskette is not

DISCUSSION

   As A Result of ODTC's Decision in CJ Case 038-94

        The text files on the subject disk are not an exact

        representation of what is found in "Applied Cryptography."

        Each source code listing has been partitioned into its own

        file and has the capability of being easily compiled into

        an executable subroutine.

This appears to be the basic rationale for ODTC's decision in this

matter.  I respectfully submit that the statement presents an

arbitrary and capricious distinction, but no meaningful difference,

between the information which is found in the Book and the

Diskette. That characterization of the Diskette provides no basis in

either law, regulations, or logic for ODTC's decision.

The Diskette is as close to Part Five of the Book as one could make

t.  The typographic layout of the Book makes it absolutely clear,

even to the non-programmer, where each cryptographic subroutine begins

and ends.  The name of each routine appears in bold font before the

uses these same names for its files.

The Response goes on to list the cryptographic routines included in

the Diskette and says that they would not be exportable if they were

ncorporated into a product. But this is irrelevant to the present

matter, since all of these routines appear in the Book, which ODTC had

already ruled in CJ Case 038-94 to be outside its licensing

be based on a comparison to the Book, which is functionally identical

to the Diskette, not to some hypothetical product.

The only real difference between the Book and the Diskette is the one

machine-readability of the Diskette.  But "machine-readability" is no

longer well defined; it cannot be limited to information stored on

computer disks.  With the widespread availability of optical character

equivalent to those on the Diskette. Moreover, this only need be done

once.  It is then absolutely trivial to duplicate and disseminate the

And even without OCR capabilities, anyone with typing skills could

easily type in the routines from the Book, again producing machine

   Regardless of the Decision in CJ Case 038-94 Because the Diskette Is

   Itself Already in the Public Domain

The issue of whether or not the Diskette is an exact representation of

the Book is really a red herring. Even if the Diskette contained

the Diskette itself is in the public domain.

The ITAR at 120.10(5) exempts from the definition of controlled

"technical data" "information in the 'public domain' as defined in

or medium on which the information must be recorded to qualify for

"public domain" status. This is hardly surprising in that any such

Amendment.

This Diskette is obviously within the "public domain".  Anyone may

obtain it by mail order from the author for a nominal charge to cover

addresses exists only because of uncertainty about US export

original authors having granted blanket copying and use permission, or

The software on this Diskette is also readily available to the public

from many "anonymous FTP" repositories on the Internet, several of

clearly qualify as "libraries open to the public" under 120.11(4).

"public domain" (in the ITAR sense) in machine readable form than in

book form, precisely because the machine readable form is so much more

   and the Press, Regardless of the Medium of Expression

The export of publicly available cryptographic information, including

The US Supreme Court has written that "[t]he liberty of the press is

not confined to newspapers and periodicals.  It necessarily embraces

comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of

nformation and opinion" (Lovell v. City of Griffin, 1938).  Freedom

of the press, says the Court, includes "the right of the lonely

large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition

methods" (Branzburg v. Hayes, 1972).

The computer network, the bulletin board system (BBS) and even

"sneakernet" (the manual exchange of diskettes) are clearly the modern

as much First Amendment protection, including the right to export

their works, as John Wiley & Sons, publishers of "Applied

Cryptography".

There is opinion that the power to control exports is a Presidential

national security and foreign policy function that deserves wide

other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the

applicable provisions of the Constitution" (US v Curtiss-Wright Corp,

to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign

Appeals for the 9th Circuit said "We ... reject ... the suggestion

that the First Amendment's protection is lessened when the expression

s directed abroad. The cases cited by the government do not support

ts contention that otherwise protected free speech interests may be

And in New York Times Co v US, 1970, popularly known as the "Pentagon

"thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the

mposition of such a restraint".

ncluding software, widely available in the United States, and even

already available in published form outside the US (such as the

Diskette) are necessary to prevent a "substantial likelihood of

The Progressive, 1979), the government gave up all further attempts to

control the dissemination of the information in question (design

became aware that the information it sought to ban had been published

n the United States. Trying to ban further dissemination of that

current attempts to control the export of public domain cryptographic

Even an Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice has

expressed the opinion that export controls on publicly available

cryptographic information are unconstitutional:

"It is our view that the existing provisions of the ITAR are

unconstitutional insofar as they establish a prior restraint on

J. Harmon, Department of Justice, to F. Press, Science Advisor to the

Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the

House Committee on Government Operations", 96th Congress, 2nd Session,

This opinion is entitled to special weight because Mr. Harmon was, at

that time, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, the office which

s responsible for preparing all the official opinions of the Attorney

General.

CONCLUSION

exemption for publicly available cryptographic software, such as the

become necessary, however, I am fully determined to seek judicial

                                        Sincerely,

                                        Philip R. Karn, Jr

******

Rep. Dan Glickman

Chairman, House Intelligence Committee

US House of Representatives

Washington, DC

Dear Representative Glickman:

encryption provisions of Rep. Cantwell's bill, HR3627, as they amend

the Export Administration Act of 1994, HR 3937.

Rep. Cantwell's reforms are sorely needed. The US State Department,

acting on behalf of the National Security Agency, stubbornly treats

even widely available public domain encryption software as a

"munition" that cannot be exported without a license -- which is

nvariably denied.

containing exactly the same encryption software that has already been

Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. This situation is

offensive to the Constitution and to common sense. It is completely

ntolerable.

Once again, I urge you to retain the provisions of Rep. Cantwell's

bill in full as your committee considers the Export Administration Act

of 1994.

                                        Sincerely,

                                        Philip R. Karn, Jr.

------------------------------

Subject: EFF's Godwin at Cyberspace Censorship Conference on CompuServe

Mike Godwin, EFF Online Counsel, will be part of a "virtual panel" at CIS's

"The Cyberconference: Censorship", Thursday, June 16.  CompuServe's

announcement states:

"Playboy magazine and the Graphics forums are hosting a "Censorship in 

Cyberspace" conference to discuss the heated media controversy surrounding 

the questions: can and should cyberspace be censored? The conference will 

feature a dialogue with highly esteemed First Amendment experts and will be 

CET). Members can send questions in advance to User ID 75300,1610. Title >

your message's subject "Playboy Conference" to ensure that your questions> 

are registered.

"To attend the conference in the Convention Center, GO CONVENTION. For 

more information about graphics and your computer, GO GRAPHICS [or GO

GRAPHNEWS].  The CompuServe Convention Center and the Graphics forums are

each a part of CompuServe's extended services."

CIS members with Internet access can reach the service by using telnet to

connect to compuserve.com.

------------------------------

Subject: A New Face at EFF - Doug Craven, Office Manager/Bookkeeper

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Originally from Miami Florida, Doug came to EFF in May 1994 to take over

office management duties, having served as Senior Office Manager for four

years and accounting positions for another four years with previous

employers as diverse as academic institution, commercial enterprises, a

Doug graduated from Thomas Stone H.S. in Waldorf Maryland in June 1986, a

Community College, Chesapeake College, and Anne Arundel Community College,

as a Microcomputer Operations student.

Doug enjoys music and video production, biking, and swimming.  He says,

"my #1 love is my dog Katie."

------------------------------

Subject: PGP 2.6 Available from Electronic Frontier Foundation FTP Site

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The latest DOS, Unix and Mac implementations of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)

anonymous ftp.

can be obtained by reading and following the instructions in the README.Dist

file at:

ftp.eff.org, /pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/

access to the material itself is not supported at this time.

fax number or glickman@eff.org - TODAY.  See lead article for details.

Cantwell's export provisions, and ask your Senators to co-sponsor Sen.

Murray's companion bill (S1846) in the US Senate.  Congress contact

nformation is available from:

ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Issues/Activism/govt_contact.list

------------------------------

Subject: USENIX Address of EFF's Barlow Available on Cassette from O'Reilly

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: brian@ora.com (Brian Erwin)

     The globalization of the Internet, satellite-based Internet

address allocation are just three of the subjects discussed by 

leading Internet developers on four new audiotapes we just released. 

  "Notable Speeches of the Information Age, John Perry Barlow"

                USENIX Conference Keynote Address

               January 17, 1994; San Francisco, CA

          Duration: 90 minutes, ISBN: 1-56592-992-6, $9.95 (US)

          John Perry Barlow is a retired Wyoming cattle rancher, a 

lyricist since 1971 for the Grateful Dead who holds a degree in 

comparative religion from Wesleyan University. In 1990, Barlow 

co-founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation with Mitch Kapor, 

and currently serves as chair of its executive committee. 

          In his keynote address to the Winter 1994 USENIX Conference,

Barlow talks of recent developments in the national information

nfrastructure, telecommunications regulation, cryptography,

of Cyberspace. This talk explores the premise that "architecture is 

electronic frontier of the Internet is not to be replaced by electronic 

to make sure that our technological choices favor bi-directional 

communication and open platforms. Side A contains the keynote; Side B 

contains a question and answer period.

This and other O'Reilly products are available in the Americas 

and Japan through bookstores, or directly from the publisher 

(credit card orders 800-889-8969; email order@ora.com). 

For information: telephone 707-829-0515 (800-998-9938 in US & 

Canada); FAX 707-829-0104; email nuts@ora.com; or write O'Reilly & 

Associates, 103A Morris St., Sebastopol, CA, 95472, USA.  

GSA # GS-02F-6095A.  Access our online gopher catalog via "telnet 

Our international distributors:

* EUROPE (except German-speaking countries), MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA 

Holborn, London WC1V 7AA, UK.  Telephone 44-71-497-1422;

FAX 44-71-497-1426; or email danni.dolbear@itpuk.co.uk

* GERMAN-SPEAKING COUNTRIES.  International Thomson Publishing,

Konigswinterer Strasse 418, 53227 Bonn, Germany. Telephone 49-228-445171;

FAX 49-228-441342; or email 100272.2422@compuserve.com

* ASIA. International Thomson Publishing, 221 Henderson Rd.,

#05-10 Henderson Building, Singapore 0315. Telephone 65-272-6496;

FAX 65-272-6498

 * AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.  WoodsLane, Unit 8, 101 Darley Street,

Mona Vale, NSW 2103, Australia. Telephone 61-2-979-5944;

FAX 61-2-997-3348; or email woods@tmx.mhs.oz.au

------------------------------

Subject: Note About our Internet Sites

--------------------------------------

To clarify a potential confusion, please note that eff.org is our staff

machine - where we get our email, etc.  EFF's public services are available

from specific services:

ftp:       ftp.eff.org

WWW:       http://www.eff.org/

WAIS:      wais.eff.org [when available]

telnet:    n/a

Attempting to telnet, ftp, or gopher to eff.org will result in an error

message.

------------------------------

Subject: What YOU Can Do

------------------------

"Cryptography is an enormously powerful tool that needs to be controlled,

  - David A. Lytel, President's Office of Science and Technology Policy

Who will decide how much privacy is "enough"?

The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that individuals should be

able to ensure the privacy of their personal communications through any

technological means they choose.  However, the government's current

Now, more than ever, EFF is working to make sure that you are the one that

makes these decisions for yourself.  Our members are making themselves heard

on the whole range of issues.  To date, EFF has collected over 5000 letters

of support for Rep. Cantwell's bill (HR3627 - Sen. Murray's companion bill

s S1846) to liberalize restrictions on cryptography.  The bill's

mmediate and vocal support to succeed.  We also gathered over 1400 letters

language, which is in danger of being stripped from HR3627, fax the House

Committee at +1 202 225 1991, or send email to glickman@eff.org

You KNOW privacy is important. You have probably participated in our online

campaigns.  Have you become a member of EFF yet?  The best way to protect

your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your opinions heard.

EFF members are informed and are making a difference.  Join EFF today!

For EFF membership info, send queries to membership@eff.org, or send any

message to info@eff.org for basic EFF info, and a membership form.

------------------------------

Administrivia

=============

EFFector Online is published by:

The Electronic Frontier Foundation

Washington DC 20001 USA

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